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CURRENT LOBBY REFORM PROPOSALS
Edward B. Myers*
One of the earliest American political bosses is said to have responded to inquiries
about a senator from New York: "Do I know him personally? I should rather think I
do. I invented him." I Concern for the influence of lobbies is not new to American
politics. Madison is probably the first American to philosophize upon the necessity for
free associations in a democracy. 2 Others have since cautioned against the aggrandize-
ment of power within lobbies at the expense of the majority's voice in public affairs.
Various sorts of regulations have been imposed on lobbies at the state level 4 and
Congress followed suit in 1946 with the passage of the Federal Lobbying Act. 5
The Federal Lobbying Act contains two substantive reporting and registration
provisions. Section 264 requires all persons "receiving any contributions or expending
any money" to maintain detailed accounts listing their contributors, contributions, and
expenditures, and periodically to file statements reflecting those accounts with the
Clerk of the House. 6 In addition, Sect. 267 mandates registration with the Secretary of
the Senate and the Clerk of the House of "(a)ny person who shall engage himself for
pay or for any consideration for the purpose of attempting to influence the passage or
defeat of any legislation by the Congress."
By means of a narrow construction, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of the Act in United States v. Harriss. 8 The Court there stipulated that a criminal
statute is unconstitutionally vague if it "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute." 9 "On the other
hand," the Court noted that: (1) "If the general class of offenses to which the statute
is directed is plainly within its terms," '0 or (2) "if this general class of offenses can be
made constitutionally definite by a reasonable construction of the statute," 11 the
statute will not be struck down. Instead, the reasonable construction will be applied. 12
Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion in Harriss held that the Act could be
reasonably construed as constitutionally definite by. a narrow interpretation of Sect.
266.'1 The Court thereby established three prerequisites that a person must meet in
order for the Act to cover him: (1) he must have solicited, collected or received
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5. 2 U.S.C. Sects. 261-270. 2 U.S.C. Sect. 264.
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8 347 U.S. 612 (1954). The majority included Chief Justice Warren and Associate Justices Burton. Clark, Frankfurter.
Minton and Reed. Douglas, joined by Black, and, in a separate opinion, Jackson, dissented. The dissentors thought
the Act unconstitutionally vague.
9. Id. at 617.
10. Id. at 618.
11. Id.
12. Id
13. 2 U.S.C Sect. 266 reads as follows: Perions to whom chapter i applitable. The provisions fior this chapter shall apply to
any person ... who by himself, or through any agent or employee or other persons in ans manner whatsoever.
directly or indirectls, solicits, collects, or receives mone or ant other thing of value to bc used print ipalls to aid, or
the principal purpose of which person is to aid, in the accomplishment of any of the tollowing purposes: (a) the
passage or defeat of any legislation by the Congress of the United States, (b) to influence, directly or indirectly, the
passage or defeat of any legislation b.% the Congress of the United States.
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contributions, (2) one of his main purposes, or one of the main purposes of such
contributions, must have been to influence the passage or defeat of legislation by
Congress, and (3) the intended method of accomplishing this purpose must have been
through direct communication with members of Congress. 14
The avowed purposes behind the Court's construction of the Act were to have it
not only meet "the constitutional requirement of definiteness" "1 but to also keep it
from infringing on "the freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment -- freedom to
speak, publish and petition the government." 16 The second of these aims has
apparently been highly successful. The estimated numbers of Washington lobbies grow
each year. I"
In practice, however, the "main purpose" and "direct communication" standards
of Harriss have raised rather than resolved doubts as to the precise meaning of the Act.
If an organization does not subjectively consider one of its own main purposes to be
lobbying, it does not have to register. And those associations which do register report
only those legislative expenses which they themselves consider to be direct communica-
tions. 1S
There are currently more than forty lobby reform proposals before Congress. i9
Major drafting considerations behind the formulation of these proposals include the
introduction of registration and reporting requirements which, while sufficiently clear
in meaning, do not infringe upon First Amendment freedoms. A secondary concern is
the avoidance of an administrative nightmare. Arguably, a mass of administrative
requirements would jeopardize the constitutionality of any measure in that its
enforcement would probably inhibit the free exercise of First Amendment rights.
Three bills -- S. 774, 20 S. 815, 1t and S.2477 22 -- which typify the current drive
towards lobby reform are now before the Senate Committee on Government
Operations. In many respects, the bills are similar. All contain lengthy definitions of
"lobbyists" 23 and "lobbying" 24 as well as detailed registration 21 and record keeping 26
requirements. Two of the proposals explicitly exempt periodicals and books distributed
14. 347 U.S. 612, 623 (1954).
15. 347 U.S. 612,624 (1954).
16. 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954).
17. Donald R. Matthews, "Senators and Lobbyists," in Congressional Reform, ed. Joseph S. Clark, (New York: Thomas Y.
Crowell Co., 1965), p. 301.
18. Congressional Quarterly, July 27, 1974, at 1947.
19. 121 Cong. Rec. 11,509 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 1975).
20. S. 774. 94th ConR., 1st Seas. (1975).
21 S. 815, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
22. S. 2477, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. (1975).
23. S. 815, for example, defines a lobbyist as "any person (including an individual, corporation. company, association,
etc.)" who engaues in lobbvine (see note 34. infra) and who. (1) receives income of $250 or more ... during a
quarterly filing period; or of $500 or more ... durin four consecutive filing periods. when lobbying is a substantial
purpose of such employment, (2) makes an expenditure for lobbying ... of $250 or more during a quarterly filing
period, or of $500 or more during four consecutive filing periods, or (3) in the course of lobbying ... communicates
orally on eight or more separate occasions with one or more Federal officers or employees. " S. 815, Sect.3.
24. Lobbying, according to S. 815, "means a communication, or the solicitation or employment of another to make a
communication, with a Federal officer or employee in order to influence the policy-making process, but does not
include, (1) testimony before a congressional committee ... before a Federal department or agency ... ;' (2) a
communication by a Federal officer or employee, or by an officer or employee of a state or local government, acting
in his official capacity; (3) a communication or solicitation, other than a publication of a voluntary membership
organization, through the distribution in the normal course of business of an, news, editorial view, letter to an
editor, advertising or like matter by ... radio, television, newspaper, book. or periodical; (4) a communication or
solicitation by a candidate ... make in the course of a campaign for Federal Office as defined in 18 U.S.C_ 591 (b) (i.e..
-an individual whose name is presented for election as Senator or Representative in. or Delegate or Resident
Commissioner to, the Congress of the United States, whether or not such individual is elected"); or (5) a
communication or solicitation by or authorized by, (A) a national political party ... or a National. State, or local
committee ... regarding its activities, undertakings, policies (etc.) ... or (B) a political party of a State, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a territory or possession of the United States ... regarding its
activities, undertakings, policies (etc.). Id
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to the general public as well as radio or television broadcasts from coverage. 2" The
third bill, S. 2477, does the same thing by implication. 28 They all stipulate that
"compliance with the filing requirements," i.e., admission of lobbying, will "not be
taken into consideration in determining, for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954" the validity of an organization's tax-exempt status. 29 In addition, all three bills
contain civil and criminal sanctions against violations. 30
There are, however, important differences among these three bills. Though S.
2477 places the power and responsibility for the administration of the bill in the
Comptroller General's office, 31 the other two bills delegate this authority to the
Federal Election Commission (FEC). 32 Should the Commission survive the current
uproar pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Vaeo, 33 it will be the
administering body if either S. 774 or S. 815 becomes law. This problem has yet to be
resolved. 34
The feasibility of administering these acts will in large measure hinge upon the
requirements of their respective record-keeping and reporting provisions. S. 2477 clearly
has the most flexible record-keeping requirements. While the other bills contain
lengthy statements as to specific information, S. 2477 states in comparatively general
terms that "(e)ach lobbyist and each person who retains a lobbyist shall maintain such
financial records and other records ... as the Comptroller General shall prescribe as
necessary for the effective implementation of this Act." 35 Administrative advantages
attendant to this flexible approach are significant. 36 Furthermore, the constitutionality
of this section does not, on its face, appear to be questionable. If doubts arise, they will
concern the regulations promulgated by the Comptroller General. The law itself is
thereby insulated from constitutional dispute.
25. Registration provisions featured within these acts typically involve the filing of a Notice of Representation with the
oversight agency. The notice includes in S. 815, for instance, "(1) an identification of the lobbyist; (2) an
identification ... of each person on whose behalf the lobbyist expects to perform services... (3) a description of the
financial terms amd conditions 2.. under which the lobbyist is employed .. by any person, and the identification of
that person. (4) each aspect of the policy-making process which the lobbyist expects to seek to influence, including
any committee, department, or agency.., to whom a communication is to be made. the form of communication to
be used, and whether the communication is to be for or against a particular measure or action; (5) an identification
of each person who .. is expected to be acting for such lobbyist ... and (6) in the case of a voluntary membership
organization, the approximate number of members and a description of the methods by which the decision to
engage in lobbying is made." S. 815, Sect. 4.
26. The oversight agency may prescribe additional records to those usually cited by the bills as essential. Essential records
include such things as "(a) the total income received by the lobbyist, and the amount of such income attributable to
lobbying; (b) the identification of each person from whom income for lobbying is received and the amount received
(with certain exceptions); (c) the expenditures of the lobbyist, including--(1) the total expenditures of the lobbyist
... (2) an itemization of any expenditure for lobbying which exceeds $10 in amount or value .... (3) expenditures
to employ any person who engages in lobbying on behalf of such lobbyist ... (4) expenditures relating to research,
advertising, staff, entertainment (etc.) . .. (and) (d) such other information as the Commission (or other oversight
agency) shall prescribe." S. 815, Sect. 5.
27. S. 774, Sect. 2, and S. 815, Sect. 3.
28. S. 2477, Sect. 4.
29. S. 774, Sect. 6, S. 815, Sect. 7, and S. 2477, Sect. 8.
30 S. 774, Sect. 10, S. 815, Sect. 13, S. 2477, Sect. 13.
31. S. 2477, Sects. 3,9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 (1975).
32. S. 774, Sects. 2, 8, 9, 10, and S. 815, Sects. 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14.
33. Buckley v. Valeo. 44 U.S.L.W. 4127 (U.S. Jan. 30, 1976).
34. The Court held that the appointments procedure whereby FEC members were appointed by the President pro temporn
of the Senate and Speaker of the House is unconstitutional, Specifically. the Court referredto Art. I, Sect. 2, cl. 2 of
the U.S. Constitution: '(The President) shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate. shall
appoint ... all other officers of the United States whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
which shall be established by law: but the Congress may bY law vest the Appointment of such inferior officers, as
they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law. or in the Heads of Departments." 44 U.S.L.W. 412'.
4162. The application of the appointments clause to FEC appointees is valid, the Court found, because "(u)nless
their selection is elsewhere provided for. alI officers of the United States are to be appointed in accordance with" it,
44 U.S.LW. 4127, 4166, and such selection procedures were not to be found elsewhere, 44 U.S.L.W. 4127.
4166-4170. Rather than order immediate destruction of the FEC, the Court staved judgment for 30 days in order to
give Congress an opportunity to reconstitute the Commission, which, as of April 15, 1976, had not yet been done.
35. S. 2477, Sect. 6.
Constitutional problems may arise over the reporting provisions of any of the
three proposals. All three bills would require periodic reporting with the oversight
agency of such information as "identification of the lobbyist," "identification of each
person on whose behalf the lobbyist performed services ... ," "each aspect of the
policymaking process the lobbyist sought to influence .. .," Identification of each
Federal officer or employee with whom the lobbyist communicated . ... ," "identifica-
tion of each oral or written communication...,' "identification of each person ...
who engaged in lobbying on behalf of the reporting lobbyist ... ," a copy of any
written communication used by the lobbyist ... to solicit other persons to lobby," "a
description of the procedures ... used by the lobbyist to solicit other persons to lobby
any expenditure made directly or indirectly to or from any Federal officer or
employee which exceeds $25 ... including an identification of the person or persons
making or receiving such expenditure . . .," "copies of the records required to be kept
by the lobbyist," and "such other information as the Commission may by regulation
prescribe." 3' Such requirements go far beyond most state legislation .8 as well as the
Federal Lobbying Act, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Harriss.
Enforcement procedures vary somewhat among the three bills. S. 774 is the
weakest in this area. 39 The other proposals, unlike S. 774, provide for the issuance of
advisory opinions by the oversight agency. 40 S. 815 and S. 2477, in addition contain
means whereby "any person" may file a complaint concerning statutory violations. 4,
The silence of S. 774 on these matters raises important doubts as to the possibility of its
successful implementation. Finally, S. 815 is the only one of the proposals separately to
construct an apparatus for judicial review. 42
The lobby reform proposals now before Congress have small support among the
lobbies themselves. Common Cause, the sole advocate of these bills, stands opposed by
an odd alliance: the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the United Auto Workers (UAW),
and Ralph Nader. Just why there are so many bills probably stems from a precipitious
response to Watergate and the pressures of the election year atmosphere. According to
most lobbyists, the proposals would purposely create tedious paperwork. Also, the bills
would violate, in the opinion of most lobbyists, First Amendment guarantees of
freedom of speech and the right to petition the government. 43
Public disclosure of lobbying activities is a desirable goal. It is doubtful, however,
whether the bills here discussed - S. 774, S. 815, S. 2477 - or their look-alikes Will
shed more light than confusion. What is needed is a flexible law much like the record-
keeping provision of S. 2477, discussed above. Such a law would place the major
36. By leaving the choice of reporting requirements to the oversight agency, the drafters of S. 2477 have allowed that
agency the choice of means to fit the purpose of the bill. The oversight body is not likely to overload itself or the
lobbies it oversees with unnecessary, detailed and time-consuming report forms. Such uneconomical and inefficient
procedures are more likely to arise by the methods promulgated under S. 744 and S. 815. Since it is unclear just what
must be required in the reports in order to implement a lobby reform proposal, it is more prudent to leave the choice
to the implementing organization. If a particular technique proves inadequate or burdensome, the agency can
remove it. Otherwise, an amendment to the Act -- a time-consuming process itself -would be required.
37. S. 815, Sect. 6.
38. State legislation usually requires "only that 'the subject matter of the employment' be divulged, and although there
has been no litigation on the point, it is unlikely that courts would construe this to require great detail. This
assumption is reinforced by the fact that vague docket entries have been the rule in Massachusetts since the state
attorney general held that the requirement was satisfied by an entry stating that the lobbyist was employed on 'all
matters of interest to' employers. Registrants in other states have reached the same conclusion by themselves." Lane,
jupra at 119.
39. 3 S. 774, Sects. 8, 9, 10.
40. S. 815, Sect. 10, S. 2477, Sect. 11.
41. S. 815, Sect. 11, S. 2477, Sect. 12.
42. S. 815, Sect. 12.
43. Congresional Quarterly, Sept. 27, 1975, at 2067.
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burden of promulgating disclosure requirements on the oversight agency. The law itself
would thereby be insulated from constitutional dispute, and an incentive on efficient
information processing would be instilled in the body which must process that
information.
